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A B S T R A C T
Bureaucratic performance is a crucial determinant of economic growth, but little real-world evidence exists on how
to improve it, especially in resource-constrained settings. We conducted a field experiment of a social recognition
intervention to improve record keeping in health facilities in two Nigerian states, replicating the intervention –
implemented by a single organization – on bureaucrats performing identical tasks. Social recognition improved
performance in one state but had no effect in the other, highlighting both the potential benefits and also the
sometimes-limited generalizability of behavioral interventions. Furthermore, differences in facility-level observables
did not explain cross-state differences in impacts, suggesting that it may often be difficult to predict external validity.
1. Introduction
Public spending on health and education can occupy as much as one
third of developing country government budgets, but long-standing
concerns surround the effectiveness of this expenditure (World Bank,
2004, Reinikka & Svensson, 2004). Effective bureaucracies are crucial
for economic growth and poverty reduction (Evans & Rauch, 1999), but
what makes individual bureaucrats more productive remains an open
question for research. To motivate individual bureaucrats, governments
typically use a combination of meritocratic recruitment, professional
standards, laws and civil service codes, wages and bonuses, and long-
term career rewards. The most suitable mix of incentives likely de-
pends, among other things, on aspects of the bureaucratic task at hand,
especially task complexity and the extent to which discretion on the
part of the bureaucrat is important, as well as on the information
available to political principals and on the observability of bureaucratic
performance (Aghion & Tirole, 1997). As a result, there have been
waves of management approaches and philosophies that emphasize
certain incentive schemes, often at the expense of others.
For specific, observable tasks, for example, some public organizations
have introduced bonus pay (see Basinga et al., 2011; Muralidharan &
Sundararaman, 2011; et cetera). Monetary awards, however, can be ex-
pensive to implement, particularly for developing country governments.
Further, they could even crowd out other important tasks, or cause cream
skimming of easier-to-work-with clients (Prendergast, 1999). Recently,
behavioral economists have begun to examine the use of less expensive,
targeted interventions when bureaucrats need to achieve specific tasks.
Sometimes these take the form of reminders and other kinds of choice
architecture or “nudges,” which have been shown to be cost-effective in
achieving various policy goals in the US and UK (Benartzi et al., 2017).
Social recognition can be considered as one type of nudge, whether in the
form of certificates for “employee of the month,” public ceremonies, or
other kinds of appreciation (e.g., Ashraf, Bandiera, & Jack, 2014).
In this paper we present a field experiment that we conducted to test
the effectiveness of one such behavioral incentive, a performance-
contingent social recognition intervention to increase performance on
an important task undertaken by health facility staff in Nigeria: the
tracking of income and expenditure resource streams at primary health
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care (PHC) facilities (clinics, posts, and health centres). Specifically, the
four week long intervention consisted of posting PHC facilities’ weekly
performance through a number of “stars” on a prominently displayed
“Certificate of Excellence” within the facility. In addition, the best
performing facility was promised a public award ceremony with the
Permanent Secretary of Health.
The overall goal of our trial was to overcome weak accountability
structures that can lead to ‘leakage’, and this particular instantiation matters
enough that there is a larger collaboration between the government of
Nigeria and the World Bank focused on it. Working with the government,
we rigorously evaluated a behavioral science approach by carrying out the
same intervention in a random subset of facilities within two different states
in the country (Ekiti and Niger), allowing us to directly test not only the
intervention but, more importantly, also the generalizability of the results.
Furthermore, we exploited survey data at the facility level to examine not
only which factors influence performance on expenditure tracking but also
the relative success of the intervention across environments.
In a nutshell, we found that our relatively inexpensive social re-
cognition intervention motivated bureaucrats in one of the two states yet
showed no effect in the other. Note that the dependent variable – the task
of tracking resources at the facility –was quite basic, so a successful in-
tervention may be unsurprising, but that makes the lack of success in the
other state harder to explain. None of our observable variables could ex-
plain the difference in treatment effects between states.
We contribute to several strands of literature. First, in addition to ex-
amining a social recognition intervention, our top-level treatment effects
add to literatures on incentives within bureaucracies (including preventing
corruption) and on the possible scope for behavioral interventions in de-
veloping countries. As a secondary contribution along these lines, we
contribute to the literature on interventions aimed at health systems in
developing countries. The recent work of Dunsch, Evans, Eze-Ajoku, and
Macis (2017), for example, relates closely to ours, in trying to improve
practices within health systems in Nigeria. In alignment with the findings
in that paper, we find larger effects among the simpler sub-tasks within the
broader set of resource tracking measures we capture.
Finally, we contribute to the growing literature on external validity in
development economics and behavioral sciences. Though generalizability
is not a challenge specific to randomized trials, this trial presented an op-
portunity to examine generalizability more directly than is often feasible.
We tested whether observable characteristics at the facility level (e.g.,
geographic distance between facilities, staff resources, educational attain-
ment of the local population), were predictive not only of levels and
treatment effect heterogeneity within a single state, but also of the differ-
ence in treatment effects across states, holding constant the implementing
organization. Given the lack of explanatory power of our variables, we
interpret our findings to imply that social recognition can be an effective
and relatively low-cost tool to motivate bureaucrats to complete a specific
task such as record keeping, but that its effects are dependent on social
milieu and institutional structures in ways that are difficult to measure. Our
contribution is thus not only an examination of behavioral incentive
schemes in an important and novel policy context, but also a next step in
the assessment of external validity in field experiments.
1.1. Existing literature
The idea that individuals are motivated by public and peer recognition
is not new.1 Social recognition and peer appreciation can have internal
effects on motivation, by highlighting what Cassar and Meier (2018) call
“feelings of relatedness” in job design, or external effects on motivation,
through the attribution of recognition to potential career trajectories. The
notion that individuals crave status has long been studied and has more
recently been formalized (Moldovanu, Sela, & Shi, 2007; Besley & Ghatak,
2008; Kosfeld & Neckermann, 2011) and reviewed (Ashraf and Bandiera,
2018). Psychologists sometimes worry that monetary rewards can in-
directly crowd out the valuable intrinsic motivation of agents, whereas
recognition is comparatively less likely to do so (Ryan and Deci, 2000). It
is even possible that recognition may enhance such intrinsic motivation,
for instance by making the positive attributes of the effort more salient.
Even without such a mechanism, recognition and other non-pecuniary
incentives can enhance reputations, spur competitive behavior, and/or
simply be valued in their own right.
There is consistent empirical evidence to show that employees value
recognition (for a metaanalysis see Stajkovic and Luthans, 1997; also, see
Larkin, 2011). For example, Nelson (2001) reviewed studies that identified
‘appreciation’ and ‘recognition’ as being more important than traditional
incentives such as ‘good wages’ and ‘job security’ or ‘promotion opportu-
nities.’ This observation remains true in developing countries, where fi-
nancial constraints are especially binding. A number of studies on devel-
oping countries suggest that non-financial incentives such as ‘recognition’
are important drivers of employee behavior (Mathauer & Imhoff, 2006;
Stilwell 2001); for evidence that negative recognition – e.g., peer exposure
of non-compliant companies – can also improve behavior, see Chetty,
Mobarak, and Singhal (2014) in Bangladesh.
Specifically regarding the health sector, Mathauer and Imhoff (2006)
engaged in detailed semi-structured qualitative interviews with staff from
healthcare facilities from public, private, and non-governmental organi-
zation (NGO) facilities in rural areas of Benin. They concluded that health
workers highly valued recognition and appreciation from superiors and
colleagues as well as patients. Furthermore, this valuation did not differ by
the type of institution (private, public, or NGO).
Finally, and perhaps most directly relevantly, in a field experiment
run in Zambia in collaboration with a public health organization,
Ashraf et al. (2014) randomized 800 community agents hired to sell
condoms in urban compounds into four monetary and nonmonetary
performance contingent reward treatments. Agents who were assigned
to the nonmonetary reward treatment—namely, stars for performance
plus a public ceremony for top performers—sold twice as many con-
doms as agents who were offered a modest financial margin on each
pack sold. Such a study could help in public service contexts where
management and performance could benefit from new techniques of
motivation due to, for example, limited financial resources.
In their review of the social incentives literature, Ashraf and Bandiera
(2018) conclude that the positive effect of social incentives on perfor-
mance is large, ranging between 7 and 16 percent, but that its sign de-
pends on the social group implicated in the social incentives as well as the
nature of the agents’ social preferences that underpin them (for the latter
see also recent work by Butera, Metcalfe, Morrison, and Taubinsky (2019)
about the role of the shape of the social recognition utility function for
quantifying the social efficiency of using social recognition in comparison
to financial incentives for behavior change). Specifically, in a context like
ours, where the health facility’s accounting performance was to be pub-
licly displayed to a vertical social group (i.e. non-peers; all visitors and
other types of health facility employees), social incentives typically in-
crease performance. In addition, relevant to our low-capacity context, in a
study of the Nigerian civil service, Rasul and Rogger (2018) find that 38%
of public sector projects never start, compared to 31% that actually finish,
and Khemani (2006) finds substantial levels of non-payment of salaries to
primary health care providers in Nigeria, as well as state-level variation in
the same. Therefore, the public posting of a prominent number of stars to
quantify and reward performance including a public ceremony, as used in
Ashraf et al. (2014) experiment, served as the inspiration for the specific
social recognition intervention in the present study.
1.2. External validity
The first time an intervention is shown to be effective (or not) in any
given setting has been of substantially greater interest to academic audi-
ences—and has been accompanied by substantially greater rewards for
1 See, for example, Hobbes (1651) Leviathan, Chapter 17: “men are con-
tinually in competition for honour and dignity” – cited in Hirschman (1973).
V. Gauri, et al. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx
2
academic authors—than is any subsequent attempt to replicate the finding
(Galiani, Gertler, & Romero, 2018). For policymakers, however, informa-
tion about when and where the intervention works, and for whom, is just
as important as the initial finding. Indeed, this point applies more broadly
than just to field experiments or program evaluation per se. A prominent
recent example of different treatment effects in otherwise similar settings
is that of the intergenerational effects of incarceration, examined in
Sweden and in Norway (see Dobbie, Goldon, & Yang, 2018; Bhuller, Dahl,
Loke, & Mogstad, 2018, respectively).
In our context, as in most situations, there are different possibilities
regarding the exact mechanism underlying social recognition, some of
which can be informed by sufficiently rich data on covariates. We have a
more complete set of accompanying administrative data than is typical,
though it is not complete (especially in terms of what would be needed for
many behavioral models), and we use that to empirically ascertain three
things: first, whether these covariates are predictive of the levels of the
outcome in the absence of the intervention; second, whether these cov-
ariates are predictive of the impact of the intervention; and third, most
crucially, whether the estimation of heterogeneous treatment effects al-
lows us to predict the treatment effect across state boundaries. We are able
to perform this last step, which appears relatively uncommon in field
experiments, because we were able to implement the same intervention in
the same manner and by the same organization in two different settings
(in our case states within a federal country).
Hence, in engaging the recent literature on external validity, this study
addresses two key issues. First, in relation to the work of Bold, et al. (2013),
who show that different implementers have different effects in the same
country, and Das, Friedman, and Kandpal (2018), who show that im-
plementers and populations both explain differences in effects, we are able
to show that even for a single implementer in a single country, very dif-
ferent treatment effects are obtained in different states. One need not turn
to implementer quality as an explanation, when the implementer is the
same. Second, in relation to the work of Bates and Glennerster (2017) and
Andrews and Oster (2017), we unsurprisingly show that there are multiple
covariates that predict the outcome (quality of record-keeping). However,
despite that relative wealth of predictive covariates, we find a scarcity of
covariates that are predictive of the treatment effect. Further, we find that
none of those predictive covariates predict both the treatment effect and
the difference in treatment effects across states. This suggests that even
when covariates that could be logically connected to the outcome indeed
prove to be statistically predictive of the outcome in question, these covari-
ates are not necessarily predictive of either within-setting or across-setting
treatment effect heterogeneity. Thus, they may not be sufficient to translate
treatment effects from one setting to another. Some other structural vari-
ables, potentially more difficult to quantify, such as the nature of the in-
dividuals’ underlying social preferences (Ashraf and Bandiera, 2018; Butera
et al., 2019), may drive heterogeneity in effects across settings.
2. Experimental background
In Nigeria as elsewhere, record-keeping is generally viewed as a
mundane task, with no broader pro-community mission acting as a
motivating factor to undertake the task. There is no existing incentive
for better resource tracking. In fact, there may even be perverse in-
centives to further highlight a situation of scarcity – with the assump-
tion that under-reporting of resources could lead to more assistance
especially from development partners. In addition, there is a structural
weakness to enforce accountability. Very rarely does a fear of super-
vision exist that makes facility officers ensure records are maintained,
to protect themselves from corruption allegations.
The importance of record keeping, in the Nigerian context, stems from
several factors. First and foremost is the fact that the government of
Nigeria has struggled to reliably track how much it spends on primary
healthcare. This is partly because classifications of expenditure in the
health sector tend to be too broad to capture such granular but vital in-
formation, but also because the resources (cash and in-kind) that flow to
primary healthcare in the country are heavily fragmented, with no system
in place to aggregate them into central databases. This means that it is
important to devise alternative ways of tracking income and expenditure
in the sector. In an effort to help Nigeria with that development, the World
Bank introduced an innovative continuous Public Expenditure Tracking
Survey (PETS) and Resource Tracking (RT) exercise in two states (Ekiti
and Niger), which recorded and aggregated information on resource flows
in real time, rather than following the more established practice of ret-
rospectively generating such data. In both states, the intervention and the
monitoring were conducted by the same local firm.2
The need is especially great at the primary facility level, for which
no entity above the facility level – including local government and state
authorities – has reliable information on income and expenditure
streams. One of the central issues identified by previous studies is the
weakness of accountability structures at the facility level – a gap that a
World Bank-financed intervention is attempting to address. The main
contribution of the PETS/RT has been to design and introduce relatively
simple-to-fill-out forms (spreadsheets; other resource tracking tools) to
track various income and expenditure streams. This includes, for ex-
ample, creation of a standardized cash book form (for the recording of
cash receipts from user charges e.g., consultation fees, laboratory tests,
and drug sales and expenditures such as due to purchases of drugs,
equipment, materials, or supplies, wages, and facility maintenance),
accompanied by training for staff at the facility level on how to fill out
these forms on a daily basis.
However, absent sufficient motivation, the introduction of resource
tracking forms (and instruction in their use) is not likely to change
bureaucratic behavior at the facility level. In an important sense, the
larger agenda regarding transparency and anti-corruption in countries
such as Nigeria depends, in part, on the motivation of bureaucrats to
complete their record keeping tasks. Indeed, accountability and the
reduction of ‘leakage’ is another explicit factor in the importance of
careful tracking of monetary inflows and outflows among civil servants.
Without full tracking of cash flows, it is relatively easy to divert funds
illicitly. Of course, filling out a form does not in itself guarantee accu-
racy, and dedicated agents could still manage to enrich themselves, but
being forced to explicitly report fraudulently adds an additional barrier
(both psychological and formal; Mazar & Hawkins, 2015).
In the face of this challenge, the literature discussed above suggests
that targeted interventions, such as social recognition, can be effective
motivators of behavioral change for public officials as well as for con-
sumers and citizens. Based on these insights, the clear need in the
Nigerian setting, and a growing body of evidence showing that
“nudges” to influence behavioral choices can be used to address pro-
blems in public service delivery (Ashraf, 2013; Thaler & Sunstein, 2008;
World Bank, 2015; see also Ashraf, Bandiera, & Lee, 2016), we designed
a randomized control trial (RCT) in which we tested in the field the
effectiveness of a social incentive intervention to improve performance
of record-keeping at medical facilities in Nigeria. In particular, we ex-
tended the PETS/RT exercise in the two states Ekiti and Niger, focusing
on the quality with which facility staff filled out the cash book form.
The feasibility of the possible implementation of the intervention be-
yond the study period was an important consideration in its choice and
design.
3. Data and experimental design
In 2015, the World Bank and the Government of Nigeria embarked on
a collaboration to verify that resources – funds, equipment, medication,
and so forth – are received at public health facilities in the same quantities
that they are sent by state and central government ministries. This exercise
involved regularly visiting a set of 140 facilities across two of Nigeria’s 36
states, Ekiti and Niger (see Fig. 1 and Appendix Fig. A5) to measure stocks
2 The local firm carrying out this work was Hanovia Medical Ltd., Nigeria.
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and recent flows of resources. Basic summary statistics about these facil-
ities are shown in Table 1. Most of the facilities are rural, and are open five
days a week, eight or more hours a day. About one third of the facilities
have access to electricity, most have running water, but virtually none has
a landline or mobile phone specific to the facility.
There are some differences across the two states in these char-
acteristics, also shown in Table 1. Facilities in Ekiti are larger, open
more days per week, and open more hours per day than those in Niger.
A comparable fraction of facilities in each state are categorized as rural,
however, and while neither state’s facilities are very likely to have
access to electricity, both states’ facilities are likely to have access to
water. The two states differ in many other ways; Ekiti is more densely
populated than Niger, for example: the former has a population density
comparable to that of Rwanda; the latter, lower than that of Kenya.
In light of the motivation and goals described above, we devised a
behavioral intervention that could be tested in the two states: social
recognition for good performance. From January to March 2016, we
tested the intervention in an RCT. The study leveraged the ongoing
resource tracking study across the two states. Because the underlying
expenditure-tracking survey was happening regardless, our interven-
tion had a very low marginal cost. In other environments it might be
necessary to leverage existing visits of different types, perhaps invol-
ving a lower frequency of monitoring.
Thus, we randomly assigned a total of 140 facilities in the two states to
two arms per state for the purposes of this RCT, to find out whether the
program could improve record-keeping. To maximize the study’s statistical
power, we assigned half of the facilities to each arm in each state. To ensure
that geography would not confound analysis, we stratified this randomi-
zation by state, and within state, by local government authorities (LGA);
meaning that we randomized the facilities to arms within each LGA.
Nigerian LGAs are the lowest of three tiers of Nigerian government, situated
below the federal and state levels (Khemani, 2006). We stratify on 16 LGAs
in Ekiti and 23 in Niger, so this was stricter than stratifying by state.
In Table 2, we show balance tests for the observables that, ex ante,
we hypothesized might be responsible for heterogeneity in treatment
effects. We do this for the entire sample, and separately by state. Most
covariates are balanced at conventional statistical levels, but the loga-
rithm of monthly outpatients is imbalanced in Ekiti, and the presence of
designated staff for financial accounting is imbalanced in Niger.
The treatment “arm” provides social recognition as an incentive
based on scoring the facilities’ record-keeping qualities. The record in
question was the cash book form, a simple excel balance sheet that
tracked the cash receipts from user charges as well as expenditures, by
category, on a daily basis. The quality of those records could be assessed
by enumerators who visited the facilities on a weekly basis. The precise
design of the evaluation was as follows.
For four weeks of the incentives study, the two study arms being
compared were
A. Control. Records were scored weekly by enumerators; however,
scores were not publicly shared.
B. Social Recognition. Records were scored weekly by enumerators;
scores were then converted to a number of stars between 0 and 5.
The stars were displayed in a public place on a “Certificate of
Excellence” for anyone visiting the facility to see (for a picture of the
certificate, see Appendix Fig. A1; for examples of their display, see
Appendix Fig. A4). Furthermore, the social recognition treatment
was comparative – at the end of the experimental period the best-
performing facility and all staff members who participated in com-
pleting the cash book form were commended and posed for photo-
graphs and an honorable handshake with the Permanent Secretary
of Health in a special ceremony, and this was explained in advance.
At the fifth week of the study, an additional incentive program
Fig. 1. Map of Nigeria with study sites. In the map of Nigeria above, the two study states, Ekiti and Niger, are shaded green; black dots in these areas mark the health
facilities included in the study. The federal capital, Abuja, and the largest city, Lagos, are both labeled.
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began in the Control group facilities, concluding this experiment. This
change was not announced in advance. The randomized design permits
us to attribute any differences in performance over these four weeks
(post-baseline) to the Social Recognition scheme.
3.1. Data
To measure performance, we gathered a weekly dataset on the
quality of the cash book record-keeping. The scoring “checklist,” which
assessed the quality of the records, focused on whether the cash book
had been filled out at all prior to arrival; how complete its various
sections were; and how consistent it was with other documentation
(including other forms and paper receipts); Based on the answers to
these questions, the checklist produced a weekly score for each facility.3
3.2. Implementation details
Enumerators already making weekly visits to facilities for the larger
PETS/RT project were trained on our social incentive intervention.
Each enumerator visited on average four or five facilities each week,
which could include sample facilities from the Control group, the Social
Recognition group, or both.
Facilities in the Social Recognition group were expected to display
their Certificate of Excellence in a prominent spot at the facility (see
Appendix A4 for sample photographs), so that their weekly perfor-
mance (or lack of it) would be visible to all. The assumption here was
that staff would be motivated to work better at filling out the cash book
form because of the desire to earn stronger community approbation
(quality-contingent social reward), and/or recognition from their
community (e.g., visitors, patients, other facility staff members).
Table 1
Summary statistics by state.
Ekiti Niger
Dependent variable Obs. Mean S.D. Obs. Mean S.D. p-value
Rural (indicator) 65 0.86 0.35 75 0.88 0.33 0.748
Total No of Beds 65 6.75 4.44 75 3.11 3.55 0.000***
Electricity availability 65 0.37 0.44 75 0.27 0.38 0.17
Water availability 65 0.82 0.36 75 0.89 0.3 0.214
Toilet availability 65 0.72 0.44 75 0.52 0.49 0.011**
Log(monthly outpatients) 64 4.53 0.94 75 4.99 1.19 0.012**
Outpatient gender ratio 63 3.98 1.73 75 3.39 1.56 0.039**
Patient education (secondary+ ) 61 0.7 0.21 69 0.43 0.33 0.000***
Number of days open per week 65 6.28 0.96 75 5.28 0.69 0.000***
Number of hours open per day 65 14.33 7.18 75 6.97 2.49 0.000***
Population density (per km2) 65 471.28 216.36 75 270.8 744.14 0.028**
Staff for financial accounting 65 0.58 0.5 75 0.12 0.33 0.000***
Number of staff listed on roster 65 10.74 7.26 75 4.72 5.55 0.000***
Fraction female among staff 65 0.89 0.16 75 0.47 0.36 0.000***
In the table above, for each variable, the number of observations, mean for the variable, and standard deviation of the variable are reported separately for facilities in
Ekiti and Niger state. The last column reports the p-value for the test of equality of the means in the two states. * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5%
level, and *** at the 1% level. The table is broken into four sections. The first section reports basic characteristics of the facilities; electricity, water, and toilets are
coded 1= available, 0= unavailable, and 0.5= not available “right now.” The second, third, and fourth sections report variables against which we may be
interested in testing for treatment effect heterogeneity. The first variable is the natural logarithm of the average number of outpatients per month seen in a seven-
month period, October 2015 - April 2016. Outpatient gender ratio is reported as female/male. Patient education is calculated as the average over patient exit surveys
conducted by the research team at the facility. Population density is calculated at the Local Government Authority (LGA) level from Nigeria’s 2006 census.
Table 2
Tests of covariate balance across treatment arms.
Both states Ekiti Niger
Dependent variable C T p-value C T p-value C T p-value
N=71 N=69 N=33 N=32 N=38 N=37
Log(monthly outpatients) 4.74 4.81 0.7184 4.20 4.89 0.0027*** 5.22 4.75 0.0950*
Outpatient gender ratio 3.41 3.92 0.0734* 3.65 4.32 0.1236 3.21 3.58 0.3209
Patient education (secondary+ ) 0.57 0.54 0.5697 0.72 0.68 0.4578 0.45 0.40 0.5405
Number of days open per week 5.7 5.79 0.5847 6.12 6.44 0.1859 5.34 5.22 0.4588
Number of hours open per day 9.98 10.88 0.4066 13.64 15.05 0.4317 6.80 7.18 0.5273
Staff for financial accounting 0.35 0.32 0.7240 0.52 0.66 0.2549 0.21 0.03 0.0140**
Number of staff listed on roster 7.82 7.26 0.6482 10.30 11.19 0.6282 5.66 3.78 0.1493
Fraction female among staff 0.71 0.62 0.1506 0.91 0.88 0.3580 0.54 0.40 0.1090
The table above reports differences between treatment and control arms for a set of covariates described in the first column. There are nine numeric columns: the first
three report the means for the comparison group (C) and Social Recognition treatment group (T), followed by a p-value from a test of the equality of these means. The
next three report the analogous means and test for Ekiti state; the last three report these for Niger state. * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and
*** at the 1% level.
3 For details on the exact questions, see Appendix A. Note that one of the
questions, question 8 links the main “cash book” form to a different form which
records dates and quantities for any drug shipments that the facility receives,
whether locally purchased or regionally distributed; this link allows an enu-
merator to check both forms (cash book and drug purchases) for consistency on
(footnote continued)
at least the arrival of drugs in the facility on a given day. The distribution of
scores is shown in Appendix Fig. A3.
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4. Results
We begin with results from the RCT, reporting separately in Ekiti
and Niger. Conditional on having any nonzero transactions (one of the
auxiliary questions on the checklist; note that most items on the
checklist cannot be meaningfully completed if no relevant transactions
took place over the previous week), we compare the checklist scores in
the Social Recognition arm to those in the Control arm.4 For com-
pleteness, we first display the results pooled across the two states in
Table 3A, then in Table 3B our main focus: disaggregated by state. A
visualization of those trends in both states is provided in Fig. 2 (upper
and lower panels, respectively; “Week 0” indicates baseline perfor-
mance prior to the start of the experiment).
As shown in Table 3B,5 Social Recognition—having a Certificate of
Excellence displaying the facility’s performance in public on a weekly
basis+ public ceremony for top performer at the conclusion of the trial
—improved the checklist score by 12.4 percentage points in Ekiti State:
a roughly 18-percent increase over baseline. The p-value for this effect
is 0.005. In Niger State, however, there was no detectable effect of the
Social Recognition intervention.6
To be sure that the results are not sensitive to our choice of the
simplest possible specification, we provide three alternative empirical
specifications in Table 3B. The specification in the first and fifth col-
umns is straightforward:= + +Y Socialit social it LGA it1 1 1 (1)
The outcome, Yit, is the score on the record-keeping checklist; the main
right-hand-side variable is Socialit, an indicator for whether facility i is
exposed (by the randomization) to the social recognition intervention in
period t. For facilities assigned to treatment, this is 1 for periods 1–4,
and 0 only in baseline period zero (which we do not use in our initial
specification); for facilities assigned to comparison, this is 0
throughout. Because treatment was randomized within “Local Gov-
ernment Authority,” or “LGA,” we include fixed effects for these strata.
(We also use this specification in the first column of Table 3A, including
an interaction between Socialit and an indicator for Ekiti state, Ekitii, in
the second column of Table 3A.) In the second (and sixth) column of
Table 3B, we also add the facility’s score in the week prior to inter-
vention (i.e. baseline performance in period 0) as a control variable.
Doing so increases precision slightly, but does not substantially change
the main coefficient estimate. (Analogously in Table 3A, columns 3 and
4.) In the third (and seventh) column of Table 3B, we include data from
the week prior to intervention (baseline period zero) to estimate a
difference-in-differences model:= + +Y Socialit social it i it2 2 2 (2)
As is shown in Eq. (2), we include facility fixed effects rather than
simply LGA fixed effects. This yields a higher point estimate, but with
slightly wider standard errors. (Analogously in Table 3A, columns 5 and
6.) Finally, in the fourth (and eighth) column of Table 3B (and analo-
gously in the last columns of Table 3A), we use the difference-in-dif-
ference specification of Eq. (2), but also include scores from weeks
when there were no relevant transactions at the facility. While this
mutes the effect somewhat, the coefficient remains statistically
significant.7 Except for the baseline week score included in columns 2
and 6, no baseline covariate is included in any other specification in
Table 3B. Because the logarithm of the number of outpatients was un-
balanced across treatment arms in Ekiti, we include it as a control in
regressions in Appendix Table A3. The pattern of results, in terms of
magnitude as well as statistical significance, remains unchanged.
Table 3A, corroborating the patterns in Table 3B (through only slightly
different specifications, as described above), shows an interaction be-
tween the Ekiti indicator and the social recognition treatment that is
positive and significant in three of four specifications (p < 0.01 in two
cases; p < 0.05 in one case).
The outcome throughout Tables 3A and 3B is a scoring scale that
runs from a minimum percentage score of zero to a maximum of one.
While the “score” on the checklist is the basis for the Social Recognition
incentive, on its own it may not translate or compare meaningfully to
other contexts; underlying behaviors may translate better. To clarify
this, the impact in Ekiti can be broken down into effects on each of the
ten key components of the score, as shown in Fig. 3.
As can be seen in Fig. 3, Social Recognition motivated staff in Ekiti to
complete all sections of the forms, to do so prior to enumerator arrival, and
to check the forms for their accuracy and completeness. These changes on
the first seven checklist items are all near 20 percentage points, which in
some cases is a very large fraction of the Control group value: only half of
the Control group facilities, for example, had the form checked by the
treasurer or officer-in-charge prior to the enumerator’s weekly visit.
The Social Recognition intervention, however effective at encouraging
staff to complete the cash book form, did not change the likelihood that
documentation was available to substantiate the sections of the form that
pertained to cash receipts. It also did not change the likelihood that the
different forms relating to drug acquisition agreed with one another,
though the Control group already performed relatively well on this parti-
cular component of record keeping. This may have occurred because while
record keeping officers were themselves able to enhance completeness and
accuracy of the records, documentation of cash receipts and drugs also
relied on the participation of other health workers in the facilities.
The bulk of the analysis shown here is conditional on nonzero
transaction data: that is, that there is any information to record in the
cash book form, and thus for which the checklist can assess complete-
ness and accuracy. Any changes in the rates of nonzero transaction data
that are induced by the intervention could pose a potential threat to
validity. In Appendix Table A1, we test for changes in the rates of
nonzero transaction data on the cash book form in both states, and find
no significant difference between experimental study arms.
4.1. Heterogeneity
We explore the hypothesis that the difference in treatment effect is
driven by facility-level differences rather than a different managerial
environment at the state level. In Table 4, we consider a range of di-
mensions from Table 1 along which our contexts in Ekiti and Niger
saliently differ and that could plausibly interact with the Social Re-
cognition treatment. The expected direction of their effects may depend
on various psychological and behavioral mechanisms and assumptions.
For example, busier staff could be more responsive to the treatment if
the recognition is salient as time scarcity makes staff focus on short
term outcomes (Mullainathan & Shafir, 2013), or they could be less
responsive if the payoff from the intervention is construed as to be
career benefits whose temporal distance leads them to be heavily dis-
counted. Having more women on staff or as patients could decrease the
effect of the Social Recognition intervention if women compete less for
this recognition than men do (Andersen et al., 2013), or it could make
4 Nonzero transactions are present in 80 percent of facility-weeks. The frac-
tion of weeks (out of four) that a given facility has nonzero transactions varies
from zero to one; the distribution is shown in Appendix Fig. A6.
5 Note that the pooled results presented in Table 3A (odd numbered columns)
vary based on the specification. We interpret this as inconclusive and do not
claim that there is an overall effect of social recognition across both states.
6 We have just one main outcome, but two states in which we test the in-
tervention’s effects on it. With an unadjusted p-value of 0.005, our finding is
robust to the Dunn/Bonferroni multiple test correction (in its simplest form,
multiplying the p-value by the number of tests), which yields an adjusted p-
value of approximately 0.01.
7 Note that R2 is lower in columns 1, 2, 5, and 6, and higher in columns 3, 4, 7,
and 8. This is because, as shown in Equation (2), facility fixed effects absorb a
large amount of variation.
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the treatment more effective because women may be more pro-social
than men (Eckel & Grossman, 1998). More educated patients could
either make the treatment more effective because such patients are
more likely to understand what the Certificate of Excellence stands for
and react to it, or could make the treatment less effective if more so-
cioeconomically advantaged populations—perhaps both patients and
providers—prove less likely to respond to the certificate because they
are less pro-social (Piff, Kraus, Côté, Cheng, & Keltner, 2010). Having
staff exclusively dedicated to accounting at a PHC facility could in-
crease the effect of the social recognition intervention, especially if
healthcare workers care about what that staff member thinks, or having
such staff members could reduce the effect of social recognition because
working hard on this could be seen as suggesting that the accounting
staff was previously ineffective. And the number of staff listed on the
roster could increase the effectiveness of social recognition – a larger
number of peers could increase the pressure on staff to perform and
attain recognition – but it could also conceivably reduce the effect of
social recognition because it could make it easier for responsibility to
become diffuse through a bystander effect (Chekroun & Brauer, 2002).
Accordingly, in Table 4 we show results from a series of tests. In
each row of the table, Columns 1 and 2 report coefficients and p-values
from estimation of an equation of the form:
= + + + +Y Social X Social X·it social it direct i interaction it i LGA it3 3 3 3 3
(3)
In each row, we report tests of whether a single covariate, Xi, has a
direct effect, predicting the levels of the main outcome (β3direct), or an
interaction with the social recognition treatment, predicting
Table 3A
Main effects, pooled across states.
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Social recognition 0.032 −0.020 0.034 −0.009 0.091** 0.014 0.081** 0.054
(0.025) (0.027) (0.022) (0.025) (0.035) (0.03) (0.032) (0.039)
Social recognition× Ekiti 0.144*** 0.114*** 0.176** 0.055
(0.051) (0.025) (0.03) (0.039)
Baseline score 0.318*** 0.290***
(0.087) (0.084)
Constant 0.681*** 0.679*** 0.477*** 0.493*** 0.650*** 0.653*** 0.671*** 0.671***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.057) (0.054) (0.014) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013)
R2 0.326 0.349 0.396 0.410 0.625 0.635 0.578 0.579
F test 4.325 4.646 4.986 3.191
p-value from F test 0.0152 0.0113 0.0082 0.0441
Observations 459 459 451 451 558 558 696 696
The table above reports estimated treatment effects. All columns pool Ekiti and Niger states for analysis. Odd-numbered columns present pooled analysis only; even-
numbered columns interact treatment with an indicator for Ekiti state, separating the effect in Niger from that in Ekiti. Columns 1 and 2 include all treated weeks
(weeks 1 through 4) in which there is non-zero transaction data at a facility; columns 3 and 4 include the checklist score in the baseline “week zero” as a control
variable (conceptually, the “ANCOVA” specification); columns 5 and 6 show the difference-in-differences specification, in which “week zero” data are included as
separate observations for each facility, and in which the treatment indicator only switches on in week 1; and columns 7 and 8 show the difference-in-differences
specification but also include observations in weeks during which the facility had no transactions to score on the checklist. Columns 1 through 4 include Local
Government Authority (stratum) fixed effects; columns 5 through 8 do not. All standard errors are clustered at the level of the facility. * denotes significance at the
10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level.
Table 3B
Main effects.
Ekiti Niger
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Social recognition 0.124*** 0.104*** 0.190*** 0.110** −0.020 −0.011 0.014 0.054
(0.044) (0.035) (0.062) (0.052) (0.028) (0.023) (0.030) (0.039)
Baseline score 0.304*** 0.261
(0.092) (0.177)
Constant 0.742*** 0.542*** 0.702*** 0.735*** 0.638*** 0.472*** 0.619*** 0.615***
(0.033) (0.071) (0.024) (0.021) (0.018) (0.105) (0.012) (0.015)
R2 0.221 0.289 0.574 0.545 0.257 0.324 0.62 0.519
Observations 182 182 228 323 277 269 330 373
The table above reports estimated treatment effects. Columns 1 through 4 estimate treatment effects in Ekiti state; columns 5 through 8 do so in Niger state. Columns
1 and 5 include all treated weeks (weeks 1 through 4) in which there is non-zero transaction data at a facility; columns 2 and 6 include the checklist score in the
baseline “week zero” as a control variable (conceptually, the “ANCOVA” specification); columns 3 and 7 show the difference-in-differences specification, in which
‘‘week zero'' data are included as separate observations for each facility, and in which the treatment indicator only switches on in week 1; and columns 4 and 8 show
the difference-in-differences specification but also include observations in weeks during which the facility had no transactions to score on the checklist. Columns 1, 2,
5, and 6 include Local Government Authority (stratum) fixed effects. All standard errors are clustered at the level of the facility. * denotes significance at the 10%
level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level.
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heterogeneity in treatment effects (β3interaction), taking data from both
states pooled. The estimation also includes local government authority
(LGA) fixed effects (γLGA) because these were the geographic strata
within which treatment was randomized. Columns 3 and 4 provide
analogous reporting but with the sample restricted to Ekiti only. For
clarity, we rewrite the equation above, replacing the superscript “3”
with a superscript “4” for estimation within Ekiti, although the speci-
fication is the same:
= + + + +Y Social X Social X·it social it direct i interaction it i LGA it4 4 4 4 4
(4)
Finally, Column 5 reports the state-treatment interaction term after
inclusion of the covariate, Xi, and its interaction with the social re-
cognition treatment. This column estimates the following equation with
data from both states:
= + + ++ +Y Social X Social XSocial Ekiti ··it social it direct i interaction it i state treatmentit i LGA it
5 5 5 5
5 5 (5)
The coefficient reported in Column 5 of the table is the estimate of
β5state−treatment, which quantifies the difference between social recogni-
tion treatment effects in Ekiti and Niger. Without any inclusion of
covariates, this would be the difference between coefficients reported in
Columns 1 and 5 of Table 3B, or roughly 0.14.
Taking the first row of Table 4, for example, Columns 1 and 2 show
that the logarithm of the number of patients seen monthly (the covariate
used as Xi in this row) is not predictive of a facility’s level of performance
in maintaining records, nor is it predictive of the effect of the social re-
cognition intervention (both the direct association and the interaction are
estimated to be very small in magnitude and neither is statistically sig-
nificant). Columns 3 and 4 confirm that this is also true when restricting
attention to Ekiti. Column 5 shows an estimate of 0.15 in the first row
(almost unchanged from 0.14), showing that the inclusion of this covariate
did not explain the difference in treatment effects across states.
As can be seen in columns 1 and 2, though two of the covariates are
associated with performance (i.e. checklist score) at the 5 percent level,
and two more are significant at the 10 percent level, only one—fraction
female among staff—has a statistically significant association with varia-
tion in treatment effects (columns 3 and 4), and it does not explain any of
the difference in treatment effects between Ekiti and Niger (columns 5 and
6). The two covariates whose inclusion diminishes the statistical sig-
nificance of the difference between the states, number of days open per
week and staff for financial accounting, have neither a statistically sig-
nificant association with performance nor are predictive of treatment ef-
fect heterogeneity in Ekiti, and neither drives the point estimate of the
difference in treatment effects between states to zero. Finally, we neither
observe heterogeneity in treatment effect with population density (which
is significantly higher in Ekiti), nor with respect to distance to the nearest
other health facility in that state, either of which could have affected
communication between facilities and communities thereby influencing
the effectiveness of our treatment. To corroborate this, we use the LASSO
(as implemented by Ahrens, Hansen, & Schaffer, 2018) to select variables
in a pooled regression of the outcome on possible (standardized) covari-
ates and interactions with the social recognition treatment, collapsing the
dataset so that there is only one observation per facility. Results, shown in
Appendix Table A5, always select the interaction of the indicator for Ekiti
state and the social recognition treatment, but never the interaction of any
other covariate with the social recognition treatment.
In short, our observable attributes at the facility level are unable to
explain why the treatment had significant effects in Ekiti but not in
Niger. This finding may suggest the importance of institutional, man-
agerial, and perhaps even behavioral variables that are not routinely
collected in surveys.
5. Conclusion
In this paper we provide quantitative experimental evidence regarding
the effect of an incentive designed to encourage bureaucrats to perform
better at work. Specifically, we introduced a public social incentive in-
tervention for accounting staff in health facilities over a 4-week period in
two Nigerian states, Ekiti and Niger, and tested its effect on how well they
tracked their resources. As has been shown, despite being part of the same
country and despite parallel program implementation through the same
organization, the two states exhibited substantially divergent results.
The social recognition intervention had a nontrivial and statistically
Fig. 2. Record-keeping checklist score over time. In the figures above, average
scores on the record-keeping checklist (where 1.0 is the maximum score) are
plotted over time, conditional on having nonzero transactions to report on the
checklist in each week. The upper panels show each state separately; the last
panel pools both states.
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significant positive impact on performance in Ekiti but essentially no effect
in Niger. The positive outcome in Ekiti was seen across multiple sub-di-
mensions, especially regarding completeness of the target cash book form,
with less effect on the existence of substantiating documentation. Though
the intervention we study was not itself intended to be an exact replication
of any other intervention, it closely resembles the format of other social
recognition interventions (in this case, combining visual “stars” with a
public ceremony for recognition, similarly to Ashraf et al., 2014). Our
Fig. 3. Impacts on individual items on checklist in Ekiti. Each point above represents a coefficient estimate; each line above represents a 95-percent confidence
interval. Quantities plotted above are impact estimates on specific checklist items in Ekiti state, conditional on having nonzero transactions to report on the checklist.
Table 4
Interactions.
Both states Ekiti Both states
direct
1
interaction
1
direct
2
interaction
2
state treatment
3
Direct effect of covariate Interacted covariate Direct effect of covariate Interacted covariate State-treatment interaction
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Patients:
Log(patients) 0.04 p= 0.151 −0.02 p=0.520 0.03 p= 0.498 −0.03 p=0.584 0.15*** p= 0.009
Gender ratio 0.00 p= 0.881 0.03 p=0.363 0.02 p= 0.590 −0.01 p=0.863 0.16*** p= 0.004
Education 0.02 p= 0.385 0.04* p=0.078 0.10* p= 0.063 0.01 p= 0.828 0.12** p= 0.024
Pop. density . . −0.00 p=0.917 . . 0.05 p= 0.510 0.15*** p= 0.005
Operational characteristics:
Days open 0.05* p= 0.057 0.03 p=0.245 0.06 p= 0.173 −0.01 p=0.913 0.12* p= 0.080
Hours open 0.03 p= 0.263 0.03 p=0.301 0.07** p= 0.043 −0.02 p=0.707 0.20** p= 0.013
Baseline score 0.08*** p= 0.004 0.00 p=0.940 0.08*** p= 0.001 −0.03 p=0.375 0.12*** p= 0.006
KM to neighbor 0.06** p= 0.040 −0.04* p=0.050 −0.09 p=0.600 0.12 p= 0.588 0.15*** p= 0.008
Staff:
Accounting 0.05** p= 0.013 0.06** p=0.024 0.04 p= 0.434 0.07 p= 0.194 0.07 p= 0.323
Total staff 0.02 p= 0.558 0.03 p=0.311 0.07* p= 0.093 −0.03 p=0.487 0.14** p= 0.044
Fraction female −0.00 p=0.919 0.04** p=0.035 0.22** p= 0.036 −0.31** p= 0.015 0.15** p= 0.026
Columns (1) and (2) come from estimating Eq. (3), within Ekiti state only; Columns (3) and (4) come from estimating the same equation, but within both Ekiti and
Niger states pooled, shown in Eq. (4). Column (5) comes from estimating a specification with one more term, shown in Eq. (5), again within both Ekiti and Niger
states pooled. Details on variable definitions: Log(patients) is the logarithm of the monthly number of outpatients; the “patient gender ratio” is calculated among
outpatients; “Patient education” is the fraction of surveyed patients who had completed at least secondary school; “Density” refers to population density; “Staff for
accounting” is an indicator for whether each facility has a specific staff member tasked with financial accounting.
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study results may be seen as corroborating evidence that social recognition
can have substantial—though heterogeneous—effects.8
That we find a difference in effects across states both adds a layer of
complication, and connects this work to a wider literature on external
validity. Our quantitative analyses strongly suggest that contextual
factors at state, community and facility levels may play a key role in
determining the viability and effectiveness of our interventions in
particular facilities. Recent work shows that the same intervention can
have different effects in the hands of different implementers – a reg-
ularity across low-, middle-, and high-income countries (Bold et al.,
2013; Banerjee, Karlan, & Zinman, 2015; Allcott, 2015). Others have
shown that the same intervention can have different effects at different
times (Rosenzweig and Udry 2016). The present project attempted to
test for contextual factors while keeping the implementer and timing
constant.9 Ours is also not the first study to find different treatment
effects in different locations: Kremer, Miguel, and Thornton (2009), for
example, found strong effects of a merit scholarship program in one
Kenyan district but not in another. However, there were immediate
signs of differential program behavior in their case: for example, of the
127 facilities they study, spread across two districts, five immediately
quit the study following a lightning strike in one district while only one
facility left the study in the other district. We saw no such obvious
outward sign of differential program reception: none of the 140 facil-
ities dropped out of our study in either state.
Our analysis found that the reason for the heterogeneous effects
between the two states is not explained by facility-level variables of the
kind usually collected in field surveys, including measures of human
capital and facility-level productivity. Explaining heterogeneity and
assessing external validity of social recognition interventions may re-
quire the collection of new kinds of data both at the individual staff
level (e.g., social preferences, time discounting) and at the firm/min-
istry level (e.g., institutional or professional incentives including career
dynamics, supervision structures, accountability). Consistent with
Kremer and Glennerster (2011) suggestion that the success of inter-
ventions in health systems may depend on institutional context, we
speculate that the availability of institutional, psychological, and cul-
tural variables might help pin down the mechanism through which
social recognition may operate in a given context (e.g., comparison to
peers, principal-agent concerns, a gift relationship between employers
and employees, the concerns of patients and customers, and reputation
effects).10 Future work could help distinguish these potential pathways
as a function of the population and environment.
What we can say is that the RCT took place in two states that are
very different in terms of human capital and bureaucratic organization.
Across several indicators, Ekiti exhibits higher capacity than Niger, in
terms of both aspects (Table 1). In addition, figures from the 2013
Demographic and Health Survey (DHS), such as data on birth regis-
tration rates, suggest that there is more bureaucratic capacity in Ekiti.
This suggests, tentatively, that the social recognition incentive requires
higher levels of training and organization on the part of higher-level
public sector health officials in order to be effective. It may be that
social recognition was motivating for officials in Ekiti, but not Niger,
because in Ekiti healthcare workers believed that the bureaucracy had
the capacity to use social recognition as a credible input into long-term
career incentives. Indeed, qualitative interviews conducted alongside
our experiment suggested that Ekiti staff rotate more often than Niger
staff. Social recognition might be more valuable in contexts in which
staff are pursuing new positions.
Niger and Ekiti states also differ along many other dimensions; in
addition to the many demographic differences enumerated in this
paper, the drug procurement systems for the public health systems in
the two states depend on different fractions of public funding; selling
drugs on credit, which makes bookkeeping more complex, also appears
to be more widespread in Niger (Gauthier, Pimhidzai, and Saleh 2018,
Chapter 5). As in many developing countries, the bureaucratic and
managerial environment for service providers in Nigeria is highly het-
erogeneous, with variation between states and even within a single
state (Rogger, 2017). That an intervention was successful in one state,
but not another, speaks to the importance of considering this variation
when translating successful findings to a new context—even when the
implementers in both cases are the same.
It is noteworthy that the control group in Ekiti increased perfor-
mance over the study period (see Fig. 2). This suggestive upward trend
may have been due to unrelated external factors, training (i.e. learning
about how to fill out the forms correctly), spillovers from the Social
Recognition arm, or the mere fact of being monitored. The last would
be consistent with work finding that doctors improve their performance
when peers simply inquire about their work (Brock, Lange, and
Leonard, 2016) and suggests that even light-touch interventions, such
as phone calls or texts from peers, could be effective for improving
bureaucratic performance in developing countries. Consistent with the
transparency and decentralization literature (Gonçalves, 2014;
Bardhan, 2016; Gauri et al., 2015; Olken, 2007; Björkman and
Svensson, 2009), this also suggests that observation from the public
may matter. Indeed, the broader role of community engagement to
improve performance is ripe for further exploration.
In Ekiti, the Social Recognition intervention significantly improved
the quality with which facilities filled out the cash book form and
sustained the improved performance over the intervention period.
Naturally, this analysis cannot tell us anything about long-term effects
of similar approaches, and in particular whether there is potentially
either adaptation to the recognition or, on the flipside, habit formation,
regarding the desired activity.
Finally, it would be valuable to know more about the effects of our
intervention on the overall performance of the PHC staff in a multi-task
environment. For example, our measured increase in record keeping
performance may have come at the cost of other tasks the staff was also
responsible for (Holmstrom & Milgrom, 1991). While such an analysis
may be empirically difficult to operationalize when one doesn’t know
where to look for potential spill-over effects, we explored the effect on
two other performance indicators that seemed potentially likely: pa-
tient wait times and treatment times; we did not find evidence for these
kinds of externalities (see Appendix Table A4).
Future work may further explore the external validity of interven-
tions in organizational contexts and light touch ways of improving
bureaucracies in developing countries.
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Appendix A:. Scoring checklist questions assessing quality of records
Introductory question
1. Is the cash book form kept in the facility?
Auxiliary questions
1. Number of days in this week the facility is open
2. Are all entries on cash book form zero?
Main questions:
1. Prior to arrival:
Had the facility staff completely filled the cash book form before you arrived?
2. Treasurer/Officer-In-Charge (OIC) check:
Did Facility OIC/Treasurer check cash book form for inaccuracies and incompleteness?
3–7: Completeness on each day. For how many days
3. is the ‘Balance forward’ section of cash book form complete?
4. is the ‘Cash receipts from user charges’ section of cash book form complete?
5. is the ‘Cash receipts from drug sales’ section of cash book form complete?
6. is the ‘Expenditure’ section of cash book form complete?
7. is the ‘Expenditure from drug sales’ section of cash book form complete?
8. Consistency Cross-Check:
Are the drug purchases and sales records appearing on cash book form consistent with the drug purchases and sales records appearing on the drug
supplies and purchases form? (See Figs. A1–A6).
9–10. Documentation. Can the staff provide receipts/invoices or other documentation
9. to substantiate the data for cash receipts from user charges?
10. to substantiate the data for cash receipts from expenditure? (See Tables A1–A5).
Fig. A1. Appendix figure of certificate.
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Fig. A2. Appendix figure on DHS differences. The bars above show the relative positions of Ekiti and Niger in the distribution of states in Nigeria according to the
educational attainment of women.
Fig. A3. Appendix figure on score distribution.
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Fig. A4. Appendix figure on display of certificates.
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Fig. A5. Geography of sites by study arm.
Fig. A6. Nonzero transaction distribution.
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Table A3
Appendix table: Main effects with log monthly patients as control.
Ekiti Niger
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Social recognition 0.123** 0.098** −0.021 −0.010
(0.049) (0.043) (0.028) (0.025)
Baseline score 0.286*** 0.255
(0.091) (0.185)
Constant 0.682*** 0.462*** 0.577*** 0.457***
(0.136) (0.149) (0.081) (0.110)
R2 0.239 0.301 0.279 0.325
Observations 180 180 273 269
Table A2
Appendix table: differences between states, selected DHS 2013 statistics.
Ekiti Niger
[1] [2]
Percent of children whose births are registered 50.5 14.1
Percent of children with a birth certificate 29.2 5.6
Percent of women unable to read 7.5 68.5
Percent of women with no formal schooling 2.0 65.8
Percent of women with post-primary schooling 85.2 24.7
Median years of schooling among women 11.2 0.0
Percent of men unable to read 4.0 34.3
Percent of men with no formal schooling 1.0 31.1
Percent of men with post-primary schooling 90.5 57.6
Median years of schooling among men 11.5 8.8
R2 0.146 0.130
Observations 253 290
All figures above come from the 2013 Demographic and Health Survey Final Report for Nigeria (National
Population Commission and ICF International, 2013).
Table A4
Appendix table showing treatment effects on possible spillover outcomes.
Wait time Treatment duration
[1] [2]
Social recognition 0.584 −0.432
(0.767) (1.256)
Social recognition×Ekiti −0.168 −0.502
(2.322) (2.050)
R2 0.217 0.199
Wait times and treatment durations, taken from exit surveys of patients, are measured in minutes. All
standard errors are clustered at the level of the facility. * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** at the
5% level, and *** at the 1% level.
Table A1
Appendix table: Effects on likelihood of nonzero transactions, by state.
Ekiti Niger
[1] [2]
Social recognition −0.034 −0.014
(0.085) (0.039)
Constant 0.716*** 0.927***
(0.060) (0.032)
R2 0.146 0.130
Observations 253 290
The table above reports estimated treatment effects on the likelihood of having any
nonzero transactions. Column 1 estimates effects in Ekiti state; column 2 does so in Niger
state. Both columns include Local Government Authority (stratum) fixed effects. All
standard errors are clustered at the level of the facility. * denotes significance at the 10%
level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level.
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